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SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 - RULE 10B-5 -
PURCHASERS OF DEBENTURES DENIED A RIGHT
OF ACTION UNDER SECTION 10(B)
Jordan Building Corp. v. Doyle, O'Connor & Co.,
[1966-1967 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
5 91,996 (N.D. Ill. June 28, 1967).
After the great stock market crash of 1929, and in response to
President Roosevelt's call for legislation to supplement the doctrine
of caveat emptor with the new doctrine of "let the seller also be-
ware,"' Congress passed the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) 2
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act).' The
Acts were designed to protect the investor, outlaw fraud, and regu-
late the trading of securities.4 Under the Securities Act, Con-
gress granted specific remedies to purchasers of securities and care-
fully circumscribed these remedies by procedural limitations and
defenses.5 However, the courts have generally not limited them-
selves to these express remedies, but rather have found broad im-
plied remedies in the Exchange Act6 for both purchasers and sellers
under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5.7 The goal of protecting the
investor by providing unrestricted remedies under rule 10b-5 may
be laudable,' but there remains the question whether the courts in
their effort to grant investors further protection should be per-
mitted, through judicial expansion, to rewrite the provisions of the
securities laws so as to make their effect contrary to what legislative
history and rules of statutory construction would suggest it should
be?
In the recent case of Jordan Building Corp. v. Doyle, O'Connor
& Co.,'" a federal district court at first appeared eager to follow the
trend in favor of implying a right of action under rule 10b-5 to
purchasers as long as the plaintiffs submitted further evidence in
compliance with State statutes to show that knowledge of a mis-
statement was acquired before knowledge of the true facts. But
on reconsideration, the court dismissed the complaint and decided
holder. The case was remanded to the trial court where additional evidence was to be
taken in order to best determine the type of relief to be granted. Ordinarily a return
to the status quo is the best form of relief in a situation such as this. However, that was
not feasible here as the defendants had pledged their stock to third parties (query the
possibility of a collateral issue of fraud). In other words, for Browning to retain his
proportionate interest, he would most likely find it necessary to spend a considerable
amount to purchase a substantial part of the new stock issue.
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against implying a purchaser's right of action under rule 10b-5,
since Congress had provided a specific remedy for purchasers under
section 12(2) of the Securities Act.11
The plaintiffs in the Jordan case had purchased debentures of
the International Photocopy Company, Inc. They alleged that they
had been induced to purchase the grossly overvalued securities be-
cause of material misstatements made by the defendants 2 and spe-
1Wilco v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 430-31 (1953). See also SEC v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963).
215 U.S.C. 5§ 77a-bbbb (1964) [hereinafter cited as Securities Act).
3 15 U.S.C. §5 78a-hh (1964) [hereinafter cited as Exchange Act].
4 Gadsby, Historical Development of the SEC - The Governmental View, 28
GEO. WASH. L REV. 6, 9-10 (1959).
5 Comment, The Prospects for Rule X-1OB-5: An Emerging Remedy for Defrauded
Investors, 59 YALE L.J. 1120 n.9, 1121, 1126-27 (1950).
0 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1965).
7 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1967). Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act makes unlaw-
ful the contravention of specific rules and regulations prescribed by the Securities Ex-
change Commission for the protection of the investors. Rule 10b-5 specifies the rules
and regulations referred to under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act. Thus, section
10(b) sets down a basic area of unlawful conduct, and rule 10b-5 sets out in detail that
which in generality is prohibited by section 10(b). Rule 10b-5 does not create any
private right of action in either buyer or seller, but simply describes in detail certain
actions which shall be unlawful.
8 Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule lOb-5: Judicial Revision of Legislative Intent?,
57 Nw. U.L. REv. 627, 628 (1963). For an interesting discussion of this area of the
law, see Lowenfels, The Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era for Rule 10b-5,
54 VA. L. REV. 268 (1968).
9 Ruder, supra note 8.
10 [1966-1967 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 91,996 (N.D. Ill. June
28, 1967).
11 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1964).
12 Within 6 months after the purchase, the plaintiffs learned that the securities were
grossly overvalued. At that time, the plaintiffs served notice by registered mail on
each of the defendants pursuant to section 137.13 of the Illinois Securities Law of
1953, claiming that the sale of the securities was voidable. The Illinois statute pro-
vided in pertinent part:
A. Every sale of a security made in violation of the provisions of this
Act shall be voidable at the election of the purchaser exercised as provided
in sub-section B of this Section ....
B. Notice of any election provided for in sub-section A of this Section
shall be given by the purchaser, within 6 months after the purchaser shall
have knowledge that the sale of the securities to him is voidable, to each
person from whom recovery will be sought, by registered letter addressed
to the person to be notified at his last known address with proper postage
affixed, or by personal service .... ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121V, § 137.13
(Smith-Hurd 1960) (emphasis added).
The defendants moved to dismiss counts 1 and 3 of the complaint for failure to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted. With respect to count 1, the court
having initially held that there had been a violation of rule lOb-5, on reconsideration
granted the defendant's motion to dismiss and held that purchasers did not have a right
of action under rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act. With respect to count 3, the court
first decided that a determination of whether the Illinois securities laws had been vio-
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cifically posited four theories upon which rule 10b-5 relief might
be sustained."3 One theory was based on an adherence to the doc-
trine of stare decisis, for Congress had not seen fit to change the
broad judicial interpretation of the securities laws by further legis-
lation. This theory requires that in the absence of a change in
congressional policy, the court must assume that its original deci-
sion reflects the intent of Congress 4 and thus has become part of
the statute. 5 Such an assumption, however, becomes erroneous
when it is recognized that "[the general public receives knowledge
of the law through statutes and not through judicial decisions which
may or may not be published, and to which few people will have
access."' 6  Further, to equate inaction with congressional approval
of these original decisions is logically unsound.' Political consid-
erations" as well as the sheer pressure of more important business 9
often forbid Congress from taking corrective action. Thus, it would
seem that the inaction of Congress should not prevent courts from
considering anew the wisdom and rationality of prior judicial deci-
sions rendered under a statute."0
A second theory supporting the implication of a private right
of action in favor of the buyers in Jordan under rule 10b-5 was
manifested by Fischman v. Raytheon Manufacturing Co."' Here the
lated would require proof that the plaintiffs had knowledge of the misstatement before
they acquired knowledge of the true facts. On reexamination the court granted the
defendant's motion to dismiss on the grounds that the plaintiffs had failed to comply
with the Illinois statute which required an allegation by the plaintiffs that they had
notified the defendants within 6 months from the date they had knowledge of the mis-
statement.
13 Numerous arguments have been presented in support of implying a private right
of action in favor of purchasers under rule 10b-5. For a good summary of these argu-
ments, see Comment, supra note 5, at 1133-42.
14 Horack, Congressional Silence: A Tool of Judicial Supremacy, 25 TEXAS L.
REv. 247, 255 (1947).
15 Id. at 261.
.
6 Thomas, Statutory Construction When Legislation Is Viewed As a Legal Institu-
tion, 3 HARv. J. LEGIS. 191, 214-15 (1966).
17 See Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 22 (1946) (concurring opinion).
18 Id. at 23.
'9 Id.
20See Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946), where "a majority of the
Court determined that congressional inaction after judicial interpretation of congres-
sional enactment did not prevent the reversal of earlier decisions and the establishment
of a new policy." Horack, supra note 14, at 253.
21188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951), rev'g, 9 F.R.D. 707 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). The dis-
trict court dismissed the action. Professor Louis Loss of Harvard University, in dis-
cussing the Fischman case notes that the "opinion ... leaves many questions unanswered."
3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1784 (2d ed. 1961). He also observed that the
defendants probably did not argue that the shareholders should have sued under section
1140
RULE 1OB-5
court held that shareholders, as buyers, could maintain an action
under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and rule lOb-5 on the
theory that purchasers of securities would have no remedy against
fraudulent practices under the Securities and Exchange Acts if a pri-
vate right of action was not implied for them under rule 10b-5.
Strangely, the court chose to ignore section 12 (2) of the Securities
Act of 1933 which would have given the plaintiffs in this action a
remedy. Perhaps the argument advanced was that when the specific
remedies for buyers are inadvertently disregarded, a private right of
action should be implied under rule lOb-5 so as not to leave the
purchaser of securities without a remedy against fraud. In sustain-
ing such an argument it can only be concluded that the court was
rewarding professional ignorance22
A third and more meritorious argument for the implication of
a private right of action under rule 10b-5 for buyers was presented
in Ellis v. Carter.23 The court implied a buyer's right of action, as
well as a seller's, under rule 10b-5 in a desire to fulfill the domi-
nant purpose of the Exchange Act by making protection of inves-
tors "reasonably complete and effective."' The court appeared to
be well aware that the decision to imply a private right of action
in favor of buyers under rule 10b-5 amounted to a construction of
the Exchange Act which would render it inconsistent with the Se-
curities Act.25  But the court held that such a construction was
necessary so as to further the dominant policy of Congress to "pro-
vide complete and effective sanctions, public and private, with re-
12 (2) for the reason "that they felt plaintiffs would not be permitted to sue under Rule
10b-5 and did not want to give them any ideas." Id. at 1783 n.335.
Judge Parsons, writing in Jordan, attributed poor advocacy as the reason for the
court's failure to deal with section 12(2). Jordan Bldg. Corp. v. Doyle, O'Connor &
Co., [1966-1967 Transfer Binder) CCH FED. SEC L. REP. 5 91,996, at 96,384 (N.D.
Ill. June 28, 1967). Had the court applied section 12(2) of the Securities Act, there
would have been no need to imply a buyer's right of action under section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act and rule 10b-5, since according to Loss "[tlhe two acts, being in pari
materia, must be construed together .... 3 L. Loss, supra at 1781; see Rosenberg v.
Globe Aircraft Corp., 80 F. Supp. 123, 124 (E.D. Pa. 1948); McCaffrey, The Rule In
Pari Materia as an Aid to Statutory Construction, 3 LAWYER & L. NoTEs 11, 12 (1949).
_2 If a purchaser is so unfortunate as to find himself in a situation where the spe-
cific remedies under the Securities Act provide no relief, it is submitted that the pur-
chaser would be wise to bring an action under rule 10b-5. However, the purchaser
who proceeds under rule 10b-5 should be subject to the procedural limitations and
defenses expressly set forth in the Securities Act.
23 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961). Here, purchasers of stock sought damages for
fraud in connection with an asserted joint venture to acquire control of a corporation.
24 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1964).
25291 F.2d at 273. See also Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627, 631-32 (9th Cir.
1953).
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spect to the duties and obligations imposed under the two acts."26
Not only does this construction violate the settled rule of statutory
construction that specific provisions will prevail over general provi-
sions where both afford a remedy in a particular situation, 7 but it
also raises the clear implication that Congress intended to strike the
specific remedies prescribed for purchasers under the Securities Act
when it enacted the Exchange Act a year later.28 If the two acts
are viewed as one statute, it is hard to conceive that Congress would
have prescribed detailed procedural requirements and limitations in
one section and "casually nullified" them in a later section."
A fourth theory posited by the plaintiffs in Jordan was revealed
in Hooper v. Mountain States Securities Corp.3" The Hooper plain-
tiffs, as corporate trustees in bankruptcy, argued for the implication
of a right of action under rule 10b-5 predicated on the basic tort
law that a person injured by another's violation of a statute in-
tended for his protection may maintain a civil action for private
relief provided the injury sustained is other than that suffered by
the public generally.81 This basic tort law approach had been ap-
plied in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co. 2 to grant a seller of se-
26 291 F.2d at 274. Despite the fact that such a construction would mean "that
Congress in 1934 undid what it carefully did in 1933," id., the court found the general
provisions of the Exchange Act to be controlling over the specific provisions of the
Securities Act.
27 See, e.g., Montague v. Electronic Corp. of America, 76 F. Supp. 933, 936 (S.D.
N.Y. 1948), where the court stated:
The settled rule of statutory construction is that, where there is a special
statutory provision affording a remedy for particular specific cases and where
there is also a general provision which is comprehensive enough to include
what is embraced in the former, the special provision will prevail over the
general provision, and the latter will be held to apply only to such cases as
are not within the former.
See also 2 J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AN STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 5204 (3d
ed. 1943).
28 Rosenberg v. Globe Aircraft Corp., 80 F. Supp. 123, 124 (E.D. Pa. 1948).
20 Id.
30 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cit. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961).
311d. at 201-02. "'[I]t is a well-established doctrine that where remedial legisla-
tion is concerned, 'members of a class for whose protection a statutory duty is created
may sue for injuries resulting from its breach.' " Comment, supra note 5, at 1133-34;
see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §5 286-88 (1965).
32 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947). In this case, the purchasers fraudulently con-
spired through misrepresentation and suppression of the truth to induce the sale of
stock for less than its true value.
The right of action was implied into Rule 10b-5 on two grounds: first, the
common law doctrine which creates torts out of certain kinds of statutory
violations, Restatement of Torts, § 286, and second, section 29(b) of the
1934 Act which declares void any contracts made in violation of the Act
or of rules or regulations thereunder. Jordan Bldg. Corp. v. Doyle, O'Con-
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curities a private right of action under rule 10b-5. The application
of the basic tort law doctrine is generally permitted to the extent
that it does not conflict with prescribed statutory remedies that
might be available. 3 In Rosenberg v. Globe Aircraft Corp."4 the
same judge who wrote the opinion in Kardon held that plaintiffs,
as buyers, could not recover under rule 10b-5 for losses incurred
in the purchase of stock based on false and fraudulent statements
contained in the corporation's prospectus." Since Congress did
make other provision - specifically section 12 of the Securities
Act - for private relief for defrauded buyers, the court ruled that
section 12 must be applied and that it must govern exclusively. "
In addition, the court felt that any effort to imply relief under rule
10b-5 in favor of the buyer would make the 1933 and 1934 Acts
"incongruous." 7  Thus, it would appear that an implication of a
private right of action under rule 10b-5 in favor of buyers, under
the tort doctrine, would be permitted where there was no congres-
sional indication that buyers should not be able to sue under the
rule. However, such an implication would not be permitted where
the statute either withholds relief or makes other provisions for
private relief inconsistent with the application of the tort doctrine.
Although not raised in the Jordan case, an additional argument
has been raised elsewhere: if indeed the tort theory cannot be re-
lied upon, a private right of action for purchasers under rule 10b-5
may be implied under a statutory construction theory."5 The statu-
tory construction theory centers around the 1938 amendment to
section 29 of the Exchange Act. As enacted in 1934, section 29(b)
merely declared that any contract made in violation of the Ex-
ner & Co., [1966-1967 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 91,996,
at 96,384 (N.D. IM. June 28, 1967); see Ruder, supra note 8, at 637 n.53.
33 RESTATMdENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 287, comment a at 29 (1965).
34 80 F. Supp. 123 (E.D. Pa. 1948).
S5 The judge noted that in the Kardon case there had been no congressional indi-
cation that injured sellers should not be able to sue under rule lOb-5. However, in
the Rosenberg case, the judge indicated that prescribed regulations and limitations re-
garding registration statements and prospectuses, along with specific remedies for buy-
ers relying on such statements, were provided under the Securities Act. Section 11(a)
makes an issuer liable to the buyer when registration is false or misleading. 15 U.S.C.
§ 77k(a) (1964). Section 12(1) permits the buyer to sue the seller where the seller
has violated the registration requirements. 15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (1964). Section 12 (2)
affords the buyer a remedy against a seller who has used interstate facilities to com-
municate untruths or statements containing omissions in order to sell securities. 15
U.S.C. § 771(2) (1964).
56 80 F. Supp. at 124-25.
37 Id. at 125.
38 See Ruder, supra note 8, at 635, 685.
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change Act or its rules would be void as to the rights of the viola-
tor.3" In 1938, an amendment to section 29(b) was passed by
Congress imposing a short statute of limitations on actions brought
for violations of specific commission rules.4" Since a private right
of action was not expressly provided in any of these commission
rules, the effect of Congress placing this statute of limitations on
actions ,brought for violations of the rules suggested a congressional
intent that private rights of action be implied for violation of these
rules, as well as for many of the provisions of the Exchange Act
which do not expressly provide private rights of action. The courts,
by means of this argument, have had no difficulty concluding that
there is a private right of action under section 10(b) of the Ex-
change Act.4' However, it has been suggested that a careful exam-
ination of the legislative history of the Securities Act and the Ex-
change Act indicates that Congress did not intend to create an
implied right of action under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act,
rule 10b-5, or any of the other provisions of the Exchange Act
which do not expressly authorize private recovery.42 It has also
been contended that section 29(b) as amended "should be restric-
tively interpreted" to recognize a private right of action to enforce
only the specific commission rules.43 Further, an examination of
legislative history suggests that by the inclusion of certain express
remedies, Congress clearly intended to discourage the creation of
implied civil remedies.44 Finally, in an attempt to deny implied
39 Exchange Act § 29(b), 48 Stat. 903 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b)
(1964).
40 52 Stat. 1076 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1964) (proviso dause).
41 For an extensive list of cases through 1963 dealing with rule 10b-5 arranged by
circuits, see Ruder, supra note 8, at 687-90. E.g., Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374
(10th Cir. 1965); Boone v. Baugh, 308 F.2d 711 (8th Cir. 1962); Texas Continental
Life Ins. Co. v. Dunne, 307 F.2d 242 (6th Cit. 1962); Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270
(9th Cir. 1961); McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir. 1961); Hooper
v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S.
814 (1961); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 9 F.R.D. 707 (S.D.N.Y. 1949), rev'd,
188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D.
Pa. 1947).
42 Ruder, supra note 8, at 685. For a discussion of legislative history, see note 44
infra.
43 Id.
44 ld. at 635.
One of the arguments most frequently made and rejected in the reported
cases is that since the Securities Act and Exchange Act contain specific sec-
tions making a civil cause of action available, the doctrine "expressio unius
est exlusio alterius" should apply and therefore no civil liability should
exist where not expressly provided. Id. at 648.
See, e.g., Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627, 632 (9th Cir. 1953). See also 59 HARV.
L. REv. 769, 779 (1946).
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rights of action under rule 10b-5, it has been argued that the Se-
curities Act of 1933 and the Exchange Act of 1934 are undeniably
in pari materia and must be construed as a single statute.45
The Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the question of
whether a buyer's or seller's right of action may be implied under
rule 10b-5.4" In the absence of such a decision, it has been sug-
An examination of the legislative history of the Securities Act and the Exchange
Act leads to conclusions antithetical to the judicial trend granting implied private rights
of action. Where private causes of action were provided in the two acts, they were
carefully circumscribed. Ruder, supra note 8, at 645; Comment, supra note 5, at 1121.
"Where [private causes of action] were not expressly provided, the Commission was
charged with regulation by investigation, injunction, and criminal proceedings." Ruder,
supra note 8, at 645.
With respect to section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, reference to legislative history
indicates that the section was intended to provide the Securities Exchange Commission
with a catchall provision to cover unforeseen loopholes in the Securities Act and the
Exchange Act: section 10(b) "'is a catch-all clause to prevent manipulative devices.
I do not think there is any objection to that kind of a clause. The Commission should
have the authority to deal with new manipulative devices.' . . . Testimony of Mr.
Thomas G. Corcoran, Hearings on Stock Exchange Regulation Before House Com-
mittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1934)." Id. at
658. It is also important to note that section 10(b) was created for use and benefit of
the Commission and not private buyers and sellers of securities. Id. at 657.
Given the legislative history, it is difficult to understand why enlightened courts
have persistently implied a private right of action in favor of purchasers under section
10(b) of the Exchange Act and rule lOb-5, since it has long been held that interpreta-
tion of a statute cannot be inconsistent with the plain intention of Congress so as to
defeat the object of the legislation. See, e.g., Johnson v. Southern Pac. Co., 196 U.S.
1, 14 (1904).
However, it must be remembered that legislative history is only as important as
courts desire it to be. Congressional testimony has been given varying weight by courts
and commentators. See, e.g., Jackson, The Meaning of Statutes: What Congress Says
or What the Court Says, 34 A.B.A.J. 535, 537-38 (1948). Contra, Jones, Extrinsic
Aids in the Federal Courts, 25 IowA L. REV. 737, 744 (1940). See also SEC v. Robert
Collier & Co., 76 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1935) (opinion by Hand, J.).
45 Rosenberg v. Globe Aircraft Corp., 80 F. Supp. 123, 124 (E.D. Pa. 1948); Ros-
enberg v. Hano, 121 F.2d 818, 821 (3d Cir. 1941); 3 L. Loss, supra note 21, at 1781.
The majority of courts have ignored the restrictions and limitations of the Securities
Act and have consistently implied a buyer's right of action under rule 10b-5. Stevens
v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1965); Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961);
Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365
U.S. 814 (1961); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 9 F.R.D. 707 (S.D.N.Y. 1949),
aff'd in part & rev'd in part, 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951).
Other courts have been more faithful to careful legislative construction. In Rosen-
berg v. Globe Aircraft Corp., 80 F. Supp. 123 (E.D. Pa. 1948), the court found the
two acts to be unquestionably in pari materia and concluded that: "Looking at [the two
Acts] as one statute it is simply not possible that Congress, having prescribed in elab-
orate detail procedural requirements which must be fulfilled in order to enforce civil
liability attaching to a carefully defined type of violation, would have casually nullified
them all in a later section." Id. at 124; see Montague v. Electronic Corp. of America,
76 F. Supp. 933, 936 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). Contra, Osborne v. Mallory, 86 F. Supp. 869,
879 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
4 6 The Supreme Court has, however, expressed a feeling "that the Securities Ex-
change Act should not be broadened in ways not intended by Congress." Ruder, supra
note 8, at 643; see Blan v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403, 411-13 (1962).
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gested that several alternative constructions might be placed on sec-
tion 10(b) and rule 10b-5: (1) that there be permitted "no civil
actions to either buyer or seller" under rule 10b-5; (2) that "sellers
but not buyers [may] sue under [rule 10b-51, thereby giving both
buyers and sellers a civil remedy but limiting that of buyers to the
remedies provided in the [Securities Act]"; (3) that "buyers as well
as sellers [may] sue under [rule 10b-5], but to make buyers' actions
thereunder subject to the same restrictions as provided for in the
[Securities Act]"; and (4) that "buyers as well as sellers [may]
sue under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 without any distinction
whatever, free of the restrictions imposed under the [Securities
Act]." To date the courts have limited themselves to these four
alternatives and have generally chosen to follow the fourth.
A fifth alternative deserves consideration, i.e., that sellers may
sue under rule 10b-5 subject to the restrictions imposed on buyers
under the Securities Act.48 In implying a seller's right of action
under rule 10b-5, the courts have tended to give sellers an unre-
stricted civil remedy." In an effort to award buyers the same
unrestricted civil remedies, other courts have pointed to the incon-
sistency in granting unrestricted remedies to sellers under the Ex-
change Act, and only restricted remedies to buyers under the Se-
curities Act.5" The solution inevitably suggested and ultimately
followed is the elimination of the restrictions applicable to buyers
under the Securities Act in favor of unrestricted civil remedies im-
plied under rule 10b-5." The result is rationalized on the grounds
4 7 Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 273 (9th Cir. 1961). Professor Loss believes that
the purchasers of securities should not have a civil remedy under rule 10b-5, although
he hesitates to say that purchasers of securities should never be permitted to recover
under rule 10b-5. He sees only two alternative constructions: (1) that sellers should
not be permitted to recover under rule 10b-5; and (2) that sellers should be permitted
to recover under rule lOb-5, but that they should be restricted to the specific remedies
of the Securities Act. In concluding, Loss states:
it seems relatively safe to predict that the Supreme Court will someday have
to choose between abandoning the seller altogether and accepting the anom-
aly of favoring him over the buyer as inevitable under a system of securities
regulation which after all is not an integrated code adopted at a single legis-
lative sitting, however one may try to construe it so. The former solution
would be the easiest of all, but not the happiest. The anomalies and prob-
lems attendant upon [the latter solution] do not seem too great a price to
pay for the extension of a federal remedy to defrauded sellers of securities.
3 L. LOSS, supra note 21, at 1790-91.
48 Loss raises the same point but dismisses the possibility rather summarily, con-
cluding that to do so "would require too substantial a judicial rewriting of the statutes."
3 L. Loss, supra note 48, at 1790; see Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 273 (9th Cir. 1961).
40 See text accompanying notes 3 1-33 supra.
50 See, e.g., Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270,272-74 (9th Cir. 1961).
51 See Comment, supra note 5, at 1137-40.
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that Congress has shown no reason why it "would have wanted the
procedure to be different.""2  But it is questionable whether such
a conclusion can be drawn, assuming that the two statutes are in
pari materia. Since the underlying purpose of the rule of in pari
materia is harmony and effectiveness among the various parts of
the statute,53 it would seem more logical to imply sellers' remedies
circumscribed by the restrictions that govern buyers under the Se-
curities Act. Such a construction would require no more judicial
rewriting of a statute than any other attempt to clear up obscur-
ities and ambiguities in the effort to construe a statute as a whole.
Certainly the maxim of statutory construction of in pari materia
should apply to express as well as implied provisions.
JAN HORBALY
52 Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 274 (9th Cir. 1961).
53 McCaffrey, supra note 21, at 12.
